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Title: Have the tables turned with supply chains and responsibility for OHS 
management in the Western Australian resources sector? 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyse human resource supply chains and the 
responsibility of occupational health and safety management using Australian evidence from 
two unrelated research studies in the resources sector. 
Design/methodology/approach – The analysis is based on additional findings from the 
research projects using qualitative case study methodologies. The paper draws on interviews 
with the underground mining manager in study one and the OHS manager in study two, 
together with current literature on supply chains and OHS responsibility in Australia. 
Findings – This paper uses examples drawn from two research studies conducted in the 
resources sector in 2011 to present the notion that there has been a shift in responsibility and 
management of OHS from the top of the supply chain to the bottom.  
Research limitations/implications – The paper draws on two unrelated studies that 
investigated different issues in OHS management. There is a need to undertake specific 
research to confirm the argument that suggests that the OHS management systems are 
improving for the bottom of the human resources supply chain in the resources sector.  
Practical implications – Findings suggest that in the middle tier resources sector the bottom 
of the human resources supply chains have robust OHS management systems and induction 
training, contrary to the weakening of OHS management in typical supply chains in other 
sectors. 
Originality/value – Unlike manufacturing, healthcare, the public sector and transport, there 
is little research conducted in the resources sector researching supply chains and OHS 
management. This paper provides limited evidence of a differing picture in the resources 
sector than other industries; however it argues that further studies should be conducted. 
Key Words - Supply chains, occupational health and safety management, resources sector, 
human resources, Australia. 
Paper type – Research paper 
Introduction 
In recent years there have been significant advances made in the study of supply chains and 
more broadly networked forms of organisation. However in much of the literature there is, 
implicitly or explicitly, an assumption that these structures are headed by large or dominant 
organisations, with size and respective power declining the further down the chain/network 
one descends. It is further suggested that the relative power of individuals and groups within 
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these organisations declines in line with their relative subordinacy, as do their terms and 
conditions of employment, including occupational health and safety (OHS). 
Drawing on material that emerged from two case studies in the WA resources sector, we want 
to argue that this picture is overly simplistic and deterministic. The relationship between top 
tier firms and their network companion organisations is more complex than a simple 
pyramidical hierarchically ordered structure would have us believe. 
In this paper we start by reviewing recent literature on small firms and supply/value chains. 
The second section looks at recent work on OHS and supply chains. After that we briefly 
review the WA resources supply chain. In section five we present our case study material, 
which is followed by our conclusions. 
 
Small firms, value chains and production networks 
Much early work on the restructuring of supply chains, restructuring largely driven by the 
demands of Just-in-Time (JIT) production, simply assumed that small firms generally find 
themselves in secondary, and often dependant, positions in complex supply chains (see 
Rainnie, 1993). In such analyses large firms were seen to be reforming their supply chains by 
concentrating on a smaller number of much larger primary suppliers, and this reformation 
was assumed to have important negative consequences for workers farther down the supply 
chain.  This early formulation has been reinforced by more recent work examining the 
changing strategies of lead or dominant firms. In this regard, Nolan et al. (2008) have 
outlined how intense competition has driven an unprecedented wave of industrial 
concentration and consolidation that has, in turn, generated a ‘cascade effect’, wherein the 
process of large firm concentration, through the simultaneous de-merger of non-core business 
and merger of core business, spreads across the value chain at high speed, usually to the 
assumed detriment of small firms. Such concentration and consolidation are having important 
implications for supply chains. In particular, there are increasing demands to meet the 
conditions of entry to them, as conscious coordination of the chains becomes ever greater 
with the growing integration of the kinds of subcontracting structures typified by Japanese 
keiretsu, Korean chaebol, and Wal-Martian business arrangements. In turn, this is producing 
intense pressure on those bottom-tier firms which supply goods and services to global giants 
to engage in mergers so as to develop leading global positions. This means that if we examine 
firms not just as legal entities but also by their sphere of influence, far from being hollowed 
out or downsized large firms can be seen actually to have increased in size enormously in 
recent years through their closer embrace of those smaller second- or third-tier firms which 
were previously viewed as operating at arm’s length from the firms at the top of the 
hierarchy. Moreover, it raises questions concerning how the characteristics of such second- or 
third-tier firms may in fact shape the personality of the large firms which are viewed as first-
tier ones – ‘embracing’, in other words, is a two-way process which shapes both parties’ 
behaviour. 
 
For their part, Christopherson and Clark (2007) have examined dominant firms’ capacity to 
strategically combine different locational and labour force options, whilst Morgan (2009: 
589) has argued that TNCs in liberal market economies often lock themselves into clusters in 
particular localities but only weakly connect to these localities’ own institutions. In such 
situations, they suggest, networks frequently take the form of isolated hierarchies which are 
perceived as bringing only marginal benefit to less powerful members of the chain and to the 
region in which they are located. In this light, regional small-firm clusters are viewed as 
important to TNCs (or dominant firms) only insofar as they support their international 
competitiveness. In such analyses, then, the dominant large firms are seen as the system 
integrators, the ones who are driving the chain’s form, whilst the localities in which such 
clusters congregate are essentially seen as simply the bearers of large firms’ actions. 
Moreover, financialisation – the rise of the financial sphere made up of institutional investors 
and executives of large corporations at the top of GCCs/GVCs/GPNs – is viewed as further 
exacerbating the already-existing inequalities in the distribution of value in the supply chain, 
thereby making large firms even more dominant (Palpacuer 2008).   
 
Against the longstanding view of small firms as being necessarily in secondary, subservient 
and often dependent positions at the ‘bottom end’ of production networks, with the condition 
of workers being taken as being equally weak and vulnerable, we propose a more complex 
dynamic. Drawing on a more sophisticated scalar representation (Herod 2010) we point to the 
emergence of very large organisations at different points within production networks, with 
significant implications for power dynamics and value creation, transfer and capture within 
these networks. Equally, this picture demands a significant re-evaluation of the assumed 
position of weakness of workers at the ‘bottom’ of such networks.  
 
This raises the question of how such vertical thinking shapes our understandings of 
capitalism’s organization and the places of small and large firms within this.  But it also 
forces us to ponder what changing the scalar metaphor we use to describe the relationship 
between large firms and smaller ones might do for our understanding of that relationship.  
Thus, whereas use of a vertical imaginary, wherein large firms are seen to sit at the top of 
a hierarchy, encourages a point of view which sees smaller firms as subservient, with 
power flowing downhill to the bottom of the hierarchy, perhaps adoption of a more 
horizontal imaginary, in which large firms are seen to sit at the centre of a series of ever-
larger concentric circles representing rings of subcontractors and sub-subcontractors, may 
encourage a view of large and small firms which is more reciprocal – that is to say, one in 
which each is seen as capable of influencing the other and neither is assumed to 
necessarily be dominant over the other.  This suggests that theorising the relationships 
between large and small firms requires a more sophisticated understanding of scalar 
metaphors (for more on scalar metaphors and their implications, see Herod 2010). 
 
In recent years, critical analysts, basing their approach on detailed empirical analysis, have 
developed a more nuanced response. In particular, two distinct bodies of work have emerged. 
These are focussed on, firstly, EWERC at the University of Manchester (see eg Marchington 
et al 2009) and FORBA in Vienna (see eg Flecker 2009). Both have a lot to say about the 
implications for work and employment of the current round of organisational restructuring, 
though there are important differences between them. The EWERC publications are based on 
a limited number of UK based case studies. The FORBA work is based on a more extensive 
survey of the outcomes of organisational restructuring across a number of sectors in 13 
European countries. It is worth pointing out however that neither study was particularly 
focussed on small firms. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from the EWRC studies was that possible downsides to 
networked organisations could be overcome by the adoption of suitable managerial strategies, 
without there being a one size fits all approach. For FORBA the downside for employees in 
terms of deterioration of terms and conditions of employment, including OH&S, was more 
pervasive but crucially was mediated by sectoral specificities, local labour market conditions 
and the politics of place. This final point will be crucial in our examination of the resource 
sector in WA. 
 
OHS, supply chains and small business 
Internationally and in Australia policy makers and practitioners alike support the use of 
health and safety management systems as a means to develop sound organisational safety 
cultures that protect the worker (Walters & James, 2011). Management of workplace health 
and safety is complex. The uptake of such systems is determined by cost and implementation 
time (Mayhew & Quinlan, 1997). Whereas, the successful implementation of such systems is 
determined by change processes that often include a champion for the change (Frick & Wren, 
2000) while competing with other pressures such as the urgent need for production as is the 
case of the Australian resources sector (Bahn & Barratt-Pugh, 2009). These issues are 
regulated by legislative requirements to ‘provide a safe system of work’ and to have 
documentation in place to prove such analysis has occurred (OHS Act 1984). This is further 
complicated when supply chains in organisations are in play. Within human resources supply 
chains workers are engaged as contracted labour by a third party firm. Firms may engage 
contracted labour as a means to reduce costs and thereby improve competitiveness and 
financial performance (James, et al 2007). Four reasons for a negative effect on the use of 
contracted labour and occupational health and safety (OHS) practice in organisations were 
presented by James, et al (2007): 
1. Contractors are most often smaller businesses that have less sophisticated safety 
management systems.  
2. Managing contractors alongside in-house personnel can be problematic.  
3. It is difficult to develop a ‘collective voice’ when using a mix of contracted and in-house 
staff and this reduces ownership of the safety culture.  
4. The contractor may not invest in preventative health and safety measures (James, et al 
2007).  
 
Much has been written about the devolving of health and safety responsibility for contracted 
labour by the host organisation by Quinlan & Mayhew (1997); Underhill (2002); Johnstone 
and Quinlan (2006); and James, Johnstone, Quinlan & Walters (2007). Their research 
indicated several cases of host organisations attempting to shift the management and 
supervision of contracted labour back to the third party firm rather than take on that role 
themselves. Johnstone and Quinlan (2006) discuss the blurring of OHS responsibilities, 
employment conditions and the transfer of human resource management functions to labour 
agencies (Connell & Burgess, 2002). James et al (2007) explained that there was difficulty in 
distinguishing between self-employed workers and employees that is exacerbated when 
employing contracted staff when determining employer duties including health and safety 
responsibilities. Deakin (2004) called for more ‘reflexive’ forms of regulation that were less 
prescriptive allowing for employer flexibility and the sharing of employer duties between 
employment agencies and host organisations. Johnstone, Mayhew and Quinlan (2005) also 
argue that OHS regulation of contracted or outsourced labour is difficult. They maintain that 
their use “increases the likelihood of multi-employer worksites, corner-cutting, and 
dangerous forms of work disorganisation, as well as situations where the legal responsibilities 
of employers are more ambiguous and attenuated” (Johnstone, et al 2005:391). 
 
Vickers, Baldock, Smallbone, James, Ekanem and Bertotti (2003) explain the reason for 
smaller firms not investing in health and safety is due to their narrow profit margins. Whereas 
Nichols (1997:14) argues that a lack of resources in smaller businesses creates ‘structures of 
vulnerability’ and results in employees reluctant to question their employers’ management of 
OHS.    
 
As James et al (2007) found, in many cases the third party firm is a small business and 
previous research has indicated that smaller firms have higher incidences of work-related 
injury than larger ones (Bahn, 2008; Baldock, James, Smallbone & Vickers, 2006; Fabiano, 
Curro, & Pastorino, 2004; Lamm, 2002). In addition, documentation of risk is problematic 
(Eakin, Champoux, & MacEachen, 2010) for smaller firms because their management 
systems generally lack formality (Lamm, 2002; Walters, 2001). The recent work of Barrett, 
Mayson and Bahn (2011) discusses the impact of increased regulation on smaller firms with 
the impending harmonisation of occupational health and safety in Australia (January 2012) 
and finds increased support and a reduction in convoluted paperwork is needed to assist in 
meeting compliance. Walters and Lamm (2003:5) discuss the burden of compliance of OHS 
regulation and small business and state that “conforming to regulations often places greater 
financial burden on small businesses as they are unable to spread compliance costs over a 
number of products, markets or plants”. Bell (1996) also noted that time was a factor for 
regulatory compliance for smaller business. Walters and Lamm (2003) argue that improved 
health and safety compliance can be achieved in smaller firms by face-to-face contact with 
change agents such as OHS inspectors and practitioners. How smaller firms adapt to 
regulation depends not only on their attitudes to compliance and specific knowledge of the 
OHS regulations (Walters & Lamm, 2003) but also on their broader business objectives, 
competitive strategy (for example whether they primarily compete on quality or price terms), 
and their firm’s capabilities (particularly managerial and workforce knowledge, skills and 
abilities) (Barrett & Rainnie, 2002).  
The Western Australian resources sector supply chains 
The structure of the resource industry GPNs is undergoing complex reorganisation. An 
intricate network is emerging linking together small and large organisations in a complex 
lattice work of relationships that include competition and cooperation at different temporal 
and spatial levels. At the same time, employment relationships within these structures are 
becoming increasingly multifaceted involving, inter alia, labour hire organisations, FIFO, 
temporary employment visas, and contractors. Taken together the two phenomena have 
important implications for the nature of work and employment, voice and representation, 
skill, career and commitment, as well as OHS in this strategically vital sector. 
 
The resources sector is somewhat different to other industry sectors in their health and safety 
regulation requirements and employment arrangements. Specific regulation monitors health 
and safety in the mining industry in the form of the Mines Safety Inspection Act 1994 
(Government of WA, 1994) and the guidance note General Duty of Care in Western 
Australian Mines (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011). There is evidence of clear 
regulatory requirements of the duty of both the host company and the contractor to provide 
safe systems of work for contracted labour and to share the responsibility of the health and 
safety of these workers (WA OSH Regulations, 1996:6 Section 23F; Department of Mines 
and Petroleum, 2011:2). The importance of unified and national health and safety regulation 
is the focus of the harmonisation of the OHS Act and Regulations in Australia. 
 
Many second-tier mining companies have staffing arrangements that include contracted staff. 
It is not unusual to find companies with fewer employed staff than contracted workers and 
that contracted workers make up the largest part of their staffing mix. It is also a common 
practice in the resources sector to contract the use of equipment to undertake their mining 
operations.  Within the resources sector host companies or parent resources companies 
employ contracted labour from organisations much larger than themselves. So in this case the 
‘smaller firm’ is in fact the host company. So, whereas supply chains in other sectors mainly  
start with the larger company at the top of the chain and finish with smaller, often individual 
contractors at the end of the chain (James, et al 2007), in this case in the resources sector we 
see the top of the supply chain as a second tier mining company with under 100 staff 
including contractors who are serviced by the labour supplier who might have  ten times the 
staff. However, power does not necessarily equate directly with numbers employed.  
 
This paper continues the discussion of supply chains and their impact on occupational health 
and safety situated in the context of the Western Australian resources sector. It uses examples 
drawn from two research studies conducted in 2011 to present the notion that there has been a 
shift in responsibility and management of OHS from the top of the supply chain to the 
bottom. That the power exerted by the top of the supply chain results in the contracted labour 
agent having more sophisticated safety management systems than the host organisation. This 
is contrary to the Australian and international literatures.  
Method 
This paper uses evidence about human resource supply chains that emerged from two  studies 
conducted in 2011. Both studies used a case study methodology; study one documented the 
change from contracted staff to parent company staff in a small underground mining 
company in WA as it occurred ; and study two investigated the hazard identification skills of 
employees of a large mining labour agency . Yin (2003) defines a case study as an empirical 
inquiry that investigates phenomena in real life contexts. Merriam (1998, p.27) defines case 
study in terms of the end product ‘a qualitative case study is an intensive, holistic description 
and analysis of a single instance, phenomenon, or social unit’. Whereas Miles and Huberman 
(1994, p.25) describe cases as phenomena which occur in a ‘bounded context’. The two cases 
were ‘bounded’ by the parameters of the change process as it relates to safety compliance in 
study one, and the ability of employees to identify hazards in study two and does not detail all 
changes to the organisations that occurred at this time. The analysis of the data tapped into 
the strengths of qualitative research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Greabner, 2007; Yin, 
2003) to understand how organisations make and adapt to change and how people within 
organisations work according to health and safety requirements.  
 
Study one documented the change process at one of the mines of a second tier underground 
minerals mining operation in Western Australia. This company has three open cut mining 
sites and one underground mine, and an ore processing mill in WA. They moved from 
employing contracted staff in their workforce to solely in-house staff at the underground 
mine in August 2011. At this site they had staff from two different contractors as well as their 
own with a total of 77 employees, 54 of which were contractors working for the company and 
23 direct employees. Not only were staffing issues a problem, but this mining site was also 
operating under one of the contractors OHS systems, including site inductions, procedures 
and machine operation permits.  
 
Study two identified the skill level of workplace hazard identification using photographs of 
underground mining scenarios of 50 inductees of a mining labour contractor supplying 
workers to both the Australian and international resources sector. This labour contractor 
specialises in providing workers with specific skills in underground mining from exploration 
to production and rehabilitation. They are also suppliers of heavy mining machinery and 
provide workers with varying skills such as labourers, diamond drillers and shift supervisors, 
with around three hundred contracted labour located across 5 mines in Australia and 
internationally. Interviews with 20 purposively selected OHS Managers in the WA resources 
sector provided additional data for the study. However, the two research studies (see also 
REFS) revealed unexpected findings in relation to human resource supply chains and health 
and safety practice that is the topic of this paper. 
Findings  
Where in the not too distant past as the supply chain lengthened the OHS management 
weakened (Johnstone & Quinlan, 2006; James, et al  2007) it appears that recently parent 
second tier or ‘junior’ miners in Western Australia now expect their contracted labour to be 
supervised with sophisticated policies and procedures by their labour leasing agency. So 
much so, that the parent company’s expectations of their labour agencies may result in the 
agency’s documentation to be far superior to their own. Furthermore in some instances the 
parent company may even use the labour leasing agency’s OHS systems including policies, 
safe work procedures and safety inductions in lieu of developing their own. An example of 
the latter occurred in study one whereby the parent mining company chose to no longer use 
contracted staff for a number of reasons including poor communication between the 
contracted staff and in-house management and the difficulties of managing contracted staff 
(James, et al 2011; Kochran, Smith, Wells & Rebitzer, 1994; Wright, 1994). The 
underground mine manager justified why the company was changing back to using only in-
house staff, effectively identifying OHS regulatory issues creating problems with  contracted 
workers including multi-employer worksites and ambiguous legal responsibilities for 
employers (see also Johnstone et al (2005)): 
“The reason we wanted to go owner operator is that the contractor staff because they 
were from a labour hire company didn’t really want to accept responsibility for their 
people even though they were employed by them and using their equipment, so it 
made it very hard for the Shift Supervisors because they weren’t taking ownership of 
the contracted workforce”. 
 
This company moved to rehire their contracted staff as company staff within a three month 
period. They had limited and incomplete policies, safe work procedures or safety inductions 
and job descriptions in place. During the change over these documents were drafted, but not 
completed in time and the mining company continued to conduct business using the 
contractors OHS management systems for several months even though contracted staff were 
no longer employed at the mine.  
 
James and Walters (2011:989) noted that there is potential for supply chain relationships to 
enhance health and safety standards in “that scope exists for powerful supply chain actors to 
use the market power at their disposal to improve such management. For example, by laying 
down requirements as to how it is undertaken and taking action to monitor and enforce 
compliance”. This notion that parent companies at the top of the supply chain can enforce 
health and safety standards is supported by a statement made in study two by an OHS 
Manager of a labour leasing agency to the resources industry who commented that:  
“As the contractor we are expected to have systems in place that are better than the 
parent mining company’s we are supplying labour to!” 
 
This appears to be at odds with the finding of James, et al (2007) where they maintain that 
companies who contract labour may not have the ability to invest in preventative health and 
safety measures. It also challenges the findings of Nichols (1997) who argued that the use of 
contracted labour together with in-house staff resulted in the contracted staff receiving lower 
levels of supervision and training than the directly employed staff. Closer to home, a 
Victorian Parliamentary report investigating the labour hire industry in 2005 suggested that 
such companies could be deemed non-compliant in relation to such activities as induction 
training and risk assessment (Economic Development Committee, 2005). Johnstone and 
Quinlan (2006:287) noted that labour agencies are obligated to “conduct proper inductions, 
engage in hazard identification, establish risk assessment and control processes, and ensure 
the proper instruction, training and supervision of workers placed with host firms”. Sadly, in 
their 2001-05 study examining prosecutions of labour hire firms in Australia, this was not the 
case. However, in this example, the labour leasing agency had little choice but to provide 
extensive safety management systems, training and supervision that was superior to the host 
organisation in order to place their contractors.  
There is also anecdotal (????????) evidence from OHS professionals in the resources sector 
evident from our work with these companies that junior mining organisations in Australia 
‘share’ and use each other’s safe work procedures and induction paperwork with documents 
doing the rounds between them, merely adding the company logos  to make them their own. 
There is further anecdotal evidence that procedures are contained within these adopted safety 
systems documenting processes that the mine doesn’t or hasn’t ever used with equipment 
they have never had! The issue with this practice is that there is no ownership of the 
processes and no chance for employee involvement in the ensuring that the documents 
accurately reflect practice in their workplace (James, et al 2007). This is often a cost saving 
exercise to support the need for compliance in order to continue production and may in some 
cases only be a short term solution as was the case with study one while their own documents 
were developed. As on HSE manager complained: 
What you end up getting is a mish mash of one contractor’s procedures for this and 
another’s for that and we’ll use this bit and that bit. It’s an interbreeding system where we’re 
breeding a bunch of bastards! They don’t want to be seen as having a finger in the 
contractor’s pie, instead they just say “go and audit them”. To my mind that’s failing in their 
due diligence, failing in their duty of care. The project manager’s attitude is where going to 
leave it to the contractor and if the contractor stuffs up he’s the one going to jail, not us! One 
of these days the coroner’s going to say “hang on a minute you were the principal employer 
on this”. Until we get some high flyers fined these guys won’t sit up and take notice. So they 
are shaving millions of dollars of the bottom line because they are saying “we don’t have to 
do that, we’re not responsible. All you have to do is make sure the contractor is doing the 
right thing”. (using a mish mash of procedures) …they say we haven’t got a procedure for say 
Journey Management so they’ll use a procedure about mining operations from somewhere 
else. 
 
Unfortunately it is difficult to monitor such practices as the mining inspectorate in WA is 
short staffed and has large distances to cover in order to monitor compliance (personal 
communication WorkSafe WA representative).  However it should be noted that 
‘compliance’ requires documentation of a safe system of work that is regularly audited. There 
is no requirement to demonstrate that these processes have been developed specifically for 
each mine and the auditing process does not examine the accuracy of the procedures.  
Conclusion 
It is not the purpose of this article to propose a new, more complex form of analysis of 
networked organisations and their implications for workers and their terms and conditions of 
employment, particularly those in small firms (see Rainnie et al 2011a, Rainnie et al 2011b). 
Instead we have simply taken issue with the implicit or explicit assumption in much 
supply/value chain literature regarding questions of size and power in what are taken to be 
pyramidal vertically ordered structures. In particular we take issue with the assumption that 
vulnerability in all senses necessarily rises the further ‘down’ that chain one descends. 
The issues of successfully monitoring health and safety in supply chains has been the topic of 
several articles that indicate that the further down the supply chain the less robust the safety 
system. However, the balance of power within human resource supply chains in the WA 
resource sector appears to have shifted. The paper has presented evidence that the top of the 
supply chain in the second tier mining industry may not have safety systems that are as 
sophisticated as their labour leasing agencies. It has also shown that although their own 
systems are insufficient they can demand that their labour leasing agent provides superior 
documentation, training and supervision as a precursor for hiring their contracted staff.  
However, continued research in the area of supply chains is needed to indeed investigate 
whether the evidence presented in this paper is occurring throughout the resources industry or 
that the two cases presented here are unique.  
 
There is also a need to address the imbalance of host and contractor OHS responsibilities and 
safety system documentation and compliance. It is indeed worrying the ease at which smaller 
resources companies can copy and reproduce the documents of others and call them their 
own, without careful analysis of the applicability to their operations. In addition, it is hard to 
accept that this workforce can remain safe if workers are not involved in the analysis of the 
risks they face in their day-to-day operations. Further research is needed to develop strategies 
that encourage detailed whole of workforce analysis of workplace safety practice. 
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